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Criminal Accountability and Wall Street Executives:
Why the Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Fall Short
Jennifer G. Chawla*
I. Introduction
On July 31, 2012, a federal jury acquitted Brian Stoker, a former mid-level manager of
Citigroup Inc. (“Citigroup”), of charges that he misled investors as part of Citigroup’s complex
mortgage securities scheme.1 This investment scheme was just one of many that large banks
perpetuated in the years leading up to the recent financial crisis, and this case was just another of
the federal government’s unsuccessful attempts to hold an individual banking executive
accountable.2 But there was something unique about this trial—its jury. In an unexpected move,

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Criminology, 2011, The College of New Jersey.
1
Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, Loss in Citi Case Deals Blow to U.S., WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2012, 5:53 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444860104577561380191553796.html; Peter Lattman, Former
Citigroup Manager Cleared in Mortgage Securities Case, DEALBOOK (July 31, 2012, 3:55 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/ 31/former-citigroup-manager-cleared-in-mortgage-securities-case; Grant
McCool, SEC Loses Civil Fraud Case Against Ex-Citigroup Manager, REUTERS (July 31, 2012, 6:01 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/citigroup-stoker-verdict-idUSL2E8IVFOE20120731.
The allegation against Brian Stoker was that, as lead structurer of Citigroup’s synthetic collateralized debt obligation
(CDO), known as Class V Funding III, he defrauded investors by failing to disclose that Citigroup not only had a
role in selecting the collateral for the CDO, but also was simultaneously betting against the same CDO. See
Complaint at 19, SEC v. Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-CV-7388). CDOs are bank-created
securities, formed by bundling various debt-instruments together and then selling shares of that bundle to investors.
Neal Deckant, Criticisms of Collateralized Debt Obligations in the Wake of the Goldman Sachs Scandal, 30 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 407, 411–12 (2010). During the housing boom, CDOs became a popular way for banks to make
a profit. See id. at 418–21. Soon afterwards, banks started creating synthetic CDOs by combining credit default
swaps. See id. at 425–26. Credit default swaps are investments that function as a type of insurance on other
securities; specifically, a party holding a debt obligation “swaps” the risk of investing in that obligation by paying
another party a fee in exchange for a guarantee that the other party would pay the debt in the event of a default. Id.
at 415. As a result, an investor buying a synthetic CDO was essentially betting that a bond held by someone else
would not pay off. See id. The gravamen of the SEC’s complaint was that Citigroup was creating CDOs and selling
them to investors without disclosing that they were also betting that those same CDOs would fail. See Complaint,
Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d 605 (No. 11-CV-7388). CDOs are considered to be a “root cause” of the 2008 financial
crisis. Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, DEALBOOK (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:23
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-jury-that-ruled-against-it.
2
See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (online version
titled, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures).
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the Stoker jury delivered a special message to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).3
Penned on a scrap of yellow paper torn from a legal pad, a note enclosed within the verdict
envelope read, “[t]his verdict should not deter the S.E.C. from continuing to investigate the
financial industry[.]”4
It is unusual for a jury to supplement its verdict with a statement, but this jury felt an
explanation was necessary. Although the SEC did not make a compelling case against this
executive, the jury wanted it to be clear that the federal government must continue to pursue
actions against the individuals responsible for the financial crisis.5 The problem in Stoker,
according to jury foreman Beau Brendler, was that the SEC targeted a relatively low-level
manager, one whose behavior was not only tolerated, but possibly encouraged, by his bosses.6
Mr. Stoker did not act in a vacuum. His actions were merely a glimpse into a much broader
culture on Wall Street, one pervaded with greed and irresponsibility.7 The jury believed that the
SEC was making Mr. Stoker into a scapegoat for more generalized grievances toward the
financial industry.8 For this reason, Mr. Brendler does not regret the verdict. But he does have
one lingering thought: “I wanted to know why the bank’s C.E.O. wasn’t on trial[.]”9

3

The SEC is a federal agency created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006) (“Exchange
Act”). The Exchange Act provides the SEC with disciplinary powers to enforce violations of federal securities laws.
The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
4
Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper's Guide to the
Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2010) (analyzing the culture
of financial firms in the years preceding the financial crisis and discussing how risk taking that begins as a
calculated, rational action can become emotionally compromised, and consequently irrational, as a result of
unnaturally prolonged periods of prosperity, increased competitive pressures, and unrealistic market demands).
8
Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, supra note 1.
9
Susan Beck, Stoker Jury Foreman Explains How Verdict Didn’t Absolve Citi, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Aug. 3,
2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202565823107/Stoker-Jury-Foreman-Explains-How-VerdictDidn't-Absolve-Citi; Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, supra note 1; Brian
Stoker Jury Wants Wall Street CEOs Put on Trial, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2012, 1:16 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/06/brian-stoker-jury_n_1747218.html.
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In this regard, Mr. Brendler is not alone. His remarks are representative of a general
public sentiment. In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, many are wondering why there
have been no successful prosecutions of high-ranking bank executives.10 Although the SEC filed
a handful of civil cases against managers of financial institutions,11 the Department of Justice
(DOJ)12 has not filed a single criminal charge against any senior banking executive of a large
financial institution since its first attempt at prosecuting two managers of The Bear Stearns
Companies, Inc. (“Bear Stearns”) resulted in acquittals in 2009.13
This Comment will evaluate whether the recently enacted criminal provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)14 can
facilitate the imposition of criminal liability on financial executives and allow for more effective

10

See, e.g., Peter J. Boyer & Peter Schweizer, Why Can't Obama Bring Wall Street to Justice?; Maybe the Banks
Are Too Big to Jail. Or Maybe Washington's Revolving Door Is at Work., NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2012, at 26,
available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/05/06/why-can-t-obama-bring-wall-street-tojustice.html; Morgenson & Story, supra note 2; Marian Wang, Why No Financial Crisis Prosecutions? Ex-Justice
Official Says It’s Just Too Hard, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 6, 2011, 2:08 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/why-nofinancial-crisis-prosecutions-official-says-its-just-too-hard; see also 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street (CBS
television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011), available at http://www. cbsnews.com/8334-504803_162-5741806210391709/full-coverage-60-minutes-on-the-financial-crisis/?pageNum= 2&tag=next; Frontline: The Untouchables
(PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables.
11
Brian Stoker’s case was the first of these CDO-related cases to go to trial. McCool, supra note 1. At the time of
Stoker’s acquittal, former bank managers Fabrice Tourre of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”) and
Edward Steffelin of GSC Capital Corp. were awaiting trial on similar charges. Id. The SEC ultimately dropped the
case against Steffelin. Bob Van Voris & Greg Farrell, SEC Drops Case Against Manager Who Packaged ‘Squared’
CDO, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-16/sec-drops-caseagainst-manager-who-packaged-squared-cdo.html. But the case against Tourre was successful. In August 2013, a
jury found Mr. Tourre liable on “six counts of civil securities fraud after a three-week jury trial” in which the SEC
accused Mr. Tourre of “misleading a small group of investors about the role of a big client in a 2007 trade he helped
structure. That client, the hedge fund Paulson & Company, made about $1 billion on the trade while [the other
investors] lost big.” Susanne Craig, Fabrice Tourre Seeks a New Trial, DEALBOOK (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:30 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/fabrice-tourre-seeks-a-new-trial/?_r=0.
12
While the SEC has authority to bring civil actions in response to violations of federal securities laws, The
Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml, the DOJ has
authority to file criminal charges. About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html.
13
Ben Hallman, Too Big to Jail: Wall Street Executives Unlikely to Face Criminal Charges, Source Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2012, 2:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/08/criminal-charges-wallstreet_n_1857926.html?view=screen; Peter J. Henning, Is That It for Financial Crisis Cases?, DEALBOOK (Aug. 13,
2012, 11:22 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 2012/08/13/is-that-it-for-financial-crisis-cases.
14
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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prosecutorial efforts. Part II of this Comment will discuss the underlying causes of the 2008
financial crisis as well as the potentially criminal actions by banking executives that contributed
to the burst of the housing bubble and the resulting economic collapse. This Part will then
examine the aftermath of the financial crisis, specifically the apparent decision of the DOJ not to
pursue criminal actions against large financial institutions and their chief executive officers.
Finally, this Part will describe the legislative response to the financial crisis—the Dodd-Frank
Act15—which, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act16 before it, creates new federal crimes that the DOJ
could use to prosecute individuals in the financial industry who use misleading and deceptive
tactics for their own financial gain.

Part III will explain the potential impact of criminal

sanctions on corporate executives and articulate the importance of effectively imposing criminal
liability on these individuals, as such can obtain deterrence objectives that civil liability cannot.
Part IV will then examine specific criminal provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and conclude that
they will not be effective in imposing criminal liability on corporate executives; despite their
appearances, these provisions do not substantively give the DOJ a new way to prosecute
individual financial crimes, nor do they address the issues that the DOJ seems to be having in
bringing such criminal actions. This Part will then suggest how the Dodd-Frank Act could be
improved to better achieve deterrence objectives and allow the DOJ to more effectively
prosecute individuals in the financial industry. Part V will conclude.

15

Id. at 1376 (“An Act [t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”).
16
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (“An Act [t]o protect investors
by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other
purposes.”).

4

II. The 2008 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath
A. The Causes of the Financial Crisis: Actions and Inactions of Financial Executives
Since late 2007, the United States has suffered through the worst economic downturn
since the Great Depression.17 Economic growth is slow,18 unemployment rates are high,19 and
the housing market remains fragile.20 In May 2009, Congress passed, and the President signed,
the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act.21 This Act established the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (“the Commission”), an independent panel of ten private citizens tasked with
“examin[ing] the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the
United States.”22 In January 2011, after reviewing thousands of documents, interviewing over
seven hundred witnesses, and holding nineteen public hearings in New York, Washington, D.C.,
and other communities affected by the financial crisis, the Commission published a
comprehensive report detailing its findings.23
First, the Commission concluded that the 2008 financial crisis was avoidable—“the result
of human action and inaction.”24 Although many individuals on Wall Street claimed that this
crisis could not be foreseen or averted, the Commission found that warning signs, or “red flags,”
17

Edward P. Lazear, The Worst Economic Recovery in History, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2012, at A15, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577311470997904292.html; Bob Willis, U.S. Recession
Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI.
18
Annie Lowrey, Last Quarter’s Growth Is Revised Down Sharply, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/business/economy/last-quarters-growth-is-revised-down-sharply.html.
19
Phil Izzo, Good News! The Unemployment Rate Rose, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2012, 8:58 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/11/02/good-news-the-unemployment-rate-rose.
20
Kasia Klimasinska & Betty Liu, Housing-Market Recovery in U.S. Not ‘Resounding,’ Shiller Says, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-06/housing-market-recovery-in-u-dot-s-dot-notresounding-shiller-says.
21
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (“An Act [t]o improve
enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities and commodities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds . . . for
the recovery of funds lost to these frauds, and for other purposes.”).
22
Id. at § 5, 123 Stat. at 1625.
23
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xi–xii (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
24
Id. at xvii.
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were both abundant and largely ignored.25

In the years leading up to the crisis, financial

institutions were creating, buying, and selling mortgage securities that they knew, or at least
should have known, were defective.26 The burst of subprime mortgage lending and subsequent
securitization27 led to an unsustainable rise in housing prices and, correspondingly, a substantial
increase in individual household debt; simultaneously, a vast expansion of the unregulated
derivatives trading market served to exacerbate the problem.28 Despite signs that these activities
were posing a significant threat to the financial stability of the country, Wall Street institutions
not only failed to take any mitigating actions, but continued to be active players in these risky
markets.29
The Commission also found that another significant contributing factor to the crisis was
the failure among financial institutions in the areas of corporate governance and risk
management.30 Prior to 2007, the prevailing view was that regulating financial institutions
would restrain innovation.31 Without sufficient regulation, however, banks engaged in extremely
reckless behavior, “taking on too much risk, with too little capital, and with too much

25

Id. at xvii–xviii.
Id. at xx.
27
Subprime mortgage lending refers to the practice of issuing “low-quality” mortgages, or mortgages issued to
borrowers who lack “a quality credit history.” Deckant, supra note 1, at 422. The subsequent securitization of these
mortgages refers to their being “bundled together” and sold to investors as CDOs. Id. Unsurprisingly, in early
2007, many of these subprime mortgages began to default, causing the “bubble” of inflated home prices to collapse.
Id.
28
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xx.
29
Id. For example, in 2007, just as the crisis was beginning to come to light, Citigroup was criticized for being a
major provider of loans used in leveraged buyouts. See Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’, DEALBOOK
(July 7, 2007, 10:54 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loans-were-still-dancing;
Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., The Safest Bank, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A23, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/opinion/nocera-the-safest-bank.html. Although initially lucrative, excessive
lending of this kind was particularly risky because, in the case of a credit downturn, the bank would be unable to
support the loans. See Nocera, supra. Former Citigroup Chief Executive Officer Charles Price, however, defended
his bank’s participation in this market by saying, “[a]s long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and
dance[.]” Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’, supra.
30
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xviii–xix.
31
Id.
26

6

dependence on short-term funding.”32 In addition, executive compensation systems worked to
further incentivize excessive risk-taking by rewarding executives for taking short-term risks,
often by leveraging excessive shareholder funds, without sufficient regard for the long-term
consequences.33
Another study recently found further support for the notion that inadequate regulatory
oversight may foster a criminogenic environment.34 A survey of five hundred “financial services
professionals” across the United States and the United Kingdom revealed that twenty-four
percent of respondent professionals believed, in order to be successful, they would need to
engage in unethical or illegal conduct; twenty-six percent claimed they had firsthand knowledge
of wrongdoing in the workplace; and sixteen percent said they would commit a crime if they
knew they could get away with it.35 Furthermore, thirty-nine percent of respondents said they
believed their competitors are likely to have engaged in illegal or unethical activity in order to be
successful; thirty percent stated that their compensation or bonus plans create pressure to

32

Id. at xviii.
Id. at xviii–xix. Specifically, some scholars argue that executive compensation packages focus solely on shortterm profits, which enable executives to receive large cash amounts, equity-based compensation, and bonus
compensation before the long-term consequences of their actions are realized. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010). These executives therefore have an incentive to
focus on short-term results, without giving sufficient weight to the consequences that risk-taking may have on
shareholder value in the long-term. Id. Further, these scholars argue that some executive compensation packages
are “tied to highly levered bets on the value of the banks’ assets[.]” Id. The structure of these compensation
packages gives executives even less incentive to account for the “losses that risk-taking could impose on preferred
shareholders, bondholders, depositors, and taxpayers.” Id. Not all scholars, however, agree that executive risktaking was a driving factor in the financial crisis. See Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks
Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15180, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15180.pdf (arguing that banks with “more loans and more liquid assets” performed
better than banks with “stronger capital supervision” during the financial crisis).
34
Financial Services Professionals Feel Unethical Behavior May Be a Necessary Evil and Have Knowledge of
Workplace Misconduct, According to Labaton Sucharow Survey, LABATON SUCHAROW (July 10, 2012),
http://www.labaton.com/en/about/press/Labaton-Sucharow-announces-results-of-financial-services-professionalsurvey.cfm.
35
Id.
33
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compromise ethical standards or violate the law; and twenty-three percent reported other
pressures that may lead to unethical or illegal conduct.36
Finally, the Commission concluded that “there was a systemic breakdown in
accountability and ethics.”37 Mortgage fraud, for example, flourished during 2006–2007 as a
result of low-lending standards and lenient regulation.38 Financial institutions were making
loans that they knew borrowers would not be able to afford.39 These banks then packaged the
loans and sold them to investors, even though they knew that these loans did not “meet their own
underwriting standards or those of the originators.”40 This was accomplished by disingenuously
sampling the packages of loans that they were selling so that this information would remain
undisclosed to potential investors.41
Eventually, the borrowers of the underlying mortgages began to default—the housing
market bubble burst and owners of the mortgage-backed securities lost their investments.42
Many of these investors, however, had purchased CDOs43 to insure against these losses.44 As a
result, the magnitude of the impact that these defaults would ultimately have on the economy

36

Id.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xxii.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. For example, Richard Bowen, who served as senior vice president and chief underwriter for correspondent
and acquisitions for Citigroup’s commercial lending group from 2002 to 2005, described in a recent interview how
loans that were being considered for purchase from Citigroup would consistently be missing critical documents that
would have been necessary to determine whether they met the bank’s credit policy guidelines (e.g., income
documentation necessary to verify a loan applicant’s income to debt ratio). In sum, Mr. Bowen found that sixty
percent of loans purchased either did not meet the bank’s standards or were missing too much information for the
underwriters to make an adequate evaluation of their creditworthiness. Nevertheless, the decisions of the
underwriters to turn down the purchase of such loans were reversed by “someone high up the chain of command, the
chief risk officer of the Wall Street channel.” This resulted in an increase in the “execution percentage” of these
pools and a subsequent purchase of them by Citigroup. Azmat Khan, Blowing the Whistle on the Mortgage Bubble,
PBS (Jan. 22, 2013 9:44PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financialcrisis/untouchables/blowing-the-whistle-on-the-mortgage-bubble.
42
Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial Regulation, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM.
279, 290–91 (2011).
43
Collaterized debt obligations. See discussion supra note 1.
44
Sharma, supra note 42, at 290.
37
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was not fully realized until it was revealed that many CDO issuers were not adequately
capitalized to make good on their promises to compensate protected investors from losses.45
This resulted in a domino effect of defaults and insolvency, shaking the foundation of many Wall
Street firms and crippling the United States economy.46
B. The Department of Justice’s Response: No Criminal Prosecutions
Since the publication of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Phil Angelides, who served
as chairman of the Commission, has repeatedly called upon the DOJ to pursue criminal
investigations against Wall Street executives.47 In these appeals, Chairman Angelides stressed
the importance of focusing on criminal, rather than civil, wrongdoing because the latter fails to
deter future crimes,48 something which is especially true in light of the fact that “[c]laims of
financial fraud against companies like Citigroup and Bank of America have been settled for
pennies on the dollar, with no admission of wrongdoing.”49 Chairman Angelides has further
urged the federal government to devote more resources toward pursuing these investigations,
stating that, as the situation stands, justice has not been served.50 But despite the findings of the
Commission and against the advisement of its chairman, the DOJ has failed to prosecute any top

45

See id. at 290–91.
See id.
47
Phil Angelides, Op-Ed., Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2012, at A25, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/opinion/will-wall-street-ever-face-justice.html?_r=0; Phil Angelides, Op-Ed.,
Renew Urgency on Wall Street Probe, POLITICO (Sept. 4, 2012, 10:55 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/80606.html.
48
Angelides, Renew Urgency on Wall Street Probe, supra note 47 (“Deterring future crimes can’t be accomplished
simply through fines or negotiated financial settlements—which many banks regard as the cost of doing business.
Senior executives need to know that if they violate the law, there will be real consequences.”).
49
Angelides, Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, supra note 47, at A25.
50
Id. (“No one should seek or condone prosecutions for revenge or political purposes. But laws need to be enforced
to deter future malfeasance. Just as important, the American people need to believe that a thorough investigation
has been conducted; that our judicial system has been fair to all, regardless of wealth and power; and that wrongs
have been righted.”).
46
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executive of a Wall Street institution in the years since the crisis. 51 Furthermore, as time passes,
it becomes increasingly unlikely that any such prosecution will materialize.52
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the prospect of an aggressive response from
federal law enforcement seemed promising. On June 19, 2008, the DOJ announced that the
United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York had indicted Ralph Cioffi
and Mathew Tannin, two senior managers of Bear Stearns, on counts of conspiracy, securities
fraud, and wire fraud.53 The allegations against Cioffi and Tannin were that they “marketed the
two funds as a low risk strategy, backed by a pool of debt securities such as mortgages” and,
even though they “believed the funds were in grave condition and at risk of collapse,” they
“made misrepresentations to stave off investor withdrawal.”54
As the first major prosecution stemming from the financial crisis, many followed this
case closely, as they believed it would set the scene for how future cases would unfold.55 The
prosecution, however, proved futile when a jury acquitted the managers in November 2009.56
The government’s case, which relied primarily on statements made by the executives via email,57

51

Boyer & Schweizer, supra note 10; Morgenson & Story, supra note 2; Peter Schweizer, Obama's DOJ and Wall
Street: Too Big For Jail?, FORBES (May 7, 2012, 5:36 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/05/07/obamas-doj-and-wall-street-too-big-for-jail.
52
Generally, the statute of limitations for securities fraud and other federal offenses is five years from the
commission of the alleged wrongdoing for civil actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) (2006), and ten years from the
commission of the alleged wrongdoing for a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3293(3) (2006). Time, therefore, is
running out, especially for actions that occurred during the “bubble years.” No Crime, No Punishment, Editorial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, at SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crimeno-punishment.html; see Hallman, supra note 13; Henning, supra note 13; Wang, supra note 10.
53
Press Release, Dept. of Justice, More Than 400 Defendants Charged for Roles in Mortgage Fraud Schemes as Part
of Operation “Malicious Mortgage” (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-odag551.html.
54
Id.
55
Amir Efrati & Peter Lattman, U.S. Loses Bear Fraud Case, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2009, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125788421912541971.html; Ex-Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Managers Acquitted,
REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2009, 3:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/bearstearns-managersidUSN1032890420091110; Zachery Kouwe, Bear Stearns Managers Acquitted of Fraud Charges, DEALBOOK
(Nov. 10, 2009, 3:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/ 10/2-ex-fund-managers-found-not-guilty-of-fraud.
56
Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55; Kouwe, supra note 55.
57
The prosecution used email exchanges between Cioffi and Tannin in an attempt to prove that the two managers
were personally aware of the true financial condition of the funds and lied to investors in order to keep them from
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demonstrated the difficulty of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in modern financial fraud
cases, which typically involve complex investment instruments.58
Despite this setback, the federal government remained committed to its prosecutorial
efforts. That same month, President Obama appointed United States Attorney General Eric
Holder as chairman of the newly created Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. 59 At the
time, Attorney General Holder stated that mission of the Task Force was to “hold accountable
those who helped bring about the last financial meltdown” and “to prevent another meltdown
from happening.”60 He further declared that “[w]e will be relentless in our investigation of
corporate and financial wrongdoing, and will not hesitate to bring charges, where appropriate, for
criminal misconduct on the part of businesses and business executives.”61
But in the three years since the formation of this task force, the DOJ still has not filed a
single criminal case against any major banking executive.62 It dropped its most recent attempt at
such a pursuit, an investigation into Goldman Sachs’ “Abacus” deal,63 in August 2012.64

withdrawing. Landon Thomas Jr., 2 Face Fraud Charges in Bear Stearns Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/business/20bear.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (online version
titled, Prosecutors Build Bear Stearns Case on E-Mails). Excerpted portions of the emails include statements such
as: “The subprime market looks pretty damn ugly”; “[W]e should close the funds now . . . . The entire subprime
market is toast”; “I’m fearful of these markets”; and “Believe it or not—I’ve been able to convince people to add
more money.” Id. But despite the government’s best attempts to frame this as a straightforward case of lying, the
jury did not believe the emails, once put into context, were sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Bear
Stearns Trial: How the Scapegoats Escaped, DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2009, 6:58AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/bear-stearns-trial-how-the-scapegoats-escaped. Id. After the trial, one
juror explained, “The entire market crashed . . . . You can’t blame that on two people.” Id.
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63
In 2007, Goldman Sachs created a risky investment called Abacus 2007-AC1. Although Goldman Sachs bet
against this investment, it did not inform its clients who had invested in it. These uninformed clients lost more than
a billion dollars on the deal. As a result, the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with securities fraud, specifically for
making materially misleading statements or omissions; the SEC simultaneously referred the case to the DOJ for
criminal investigation. Boyer & Schweizer, supra note 10.
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Furthermore, this lack of prosecutions seems to be indicative of a more general trend. Financial
fraud prosecutions, as a whole, are down thirty-nine percent since the accounting scandals of the
early 2000s65—a time when the DOJ was much more aggressive in prosecuting not only
financial fraud generally, but also high-level executives individually for this type of fraud.66
For example, in October 2001, it was discovered that Enron Corporation (“Enron”) had
been misrepresenting its earnings and altering its balance sheets in order to make the company
seem more profitable than it actually was.67 Eventually, this behavior prompted Enron to declare
bankruptcy.68 Shortly afterward, the DOJ charged Enron Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling with securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy; both
executives were found guilty on all counts.69 The DOJ obtained similar guilty verdicts in
criminal actions against Worldcom, Inc. (“Worldcom”) CEO Bernard Ebbers,70 Tyco
International Ltd. (“Tyco”) CEO Dennis Koslowski, and Tyco Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
Mark Swartz.71
Various theories exist to explain why the DOJ is not more actively pursuing cases of
financial fraud since the recent financial crisis. For example, some commentators suggest the
lack of regulation that perpetuated the crisis has, in its aftermath, made it difficult to
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70
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subsequently pursue those same behaviors that more adequate regulation could have prevented.72
This is because, in the past, regulators who were specifically trained to understand and dissect
complex financial matters were able to identify fraudulent practices early and, when necessary,
refer cases to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. The data collected by these regulators was
crucial to the DOJ’s efforts to build criminal cases.73 No such information is available, however,
for cases alleging fraud in connection with complex derivative securities, which were
unregulated before the crisis.74
Another possibility is that the element of mens rea, or intent, that prosecutors must prove
in a criminal case imposes too high a burden. The DOJ proffered this explanation when it
announced its decision not to prosecute Goldman Sachs.75 It was also a reason why the DOJ was
not successful in the Bear Stearns trial.76 To prove fraud in federal cases, the prosecution must
show that the defendant intended to make material misstatements or omissions,77 and this intent
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.78 This can be difficult in cases involving
complex securities sold to sophisticated investors because investment banks tend to include
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voluminous, generic disclosure statements that they can later use to claim a lack of intent to
deceive.79
Notwithstanding the merits of these theories, the sentiment among government officials,
prosecutors, and commentators seems to support the notion that, although the individual conduct
that led to the financial crisis was undoubtedly reprehensible, criminal accountability is not
realistically attainable under current law.80
C. The Congressional Response: The Dodd-Frank Act
Legislators responded to the financial crisis by enacting the Dodd-Frank Act.81 The
stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to improve “accountability and transparency in the
financial system.”82 As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act’s primary function is to introduce various
new reforms for regulating the financial industry; however, the Act also creates some new
federal crimes related to fraud and misrepresentations made by individuals engaging in
derivatives trading, future contracts, and swaps.83 These provisions, largely found in Title VII of
the Dodd-Frank Act, serve primarily to expand upon existing laws, such as the Commodity
Exchange Act,84 in order to include previously unregulated derivatives and security swap
transactions.85
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Specifically, there are two sections in the Dodd-Frank Act that address the use of
deceptive devices, materially misleading statements or omissions, and fraud in financial
transactions: Sections 741 and 747. Section 741 provides that it shall be a crime for a person to,
in connection with making a future contract or swap of securities, “employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud”; “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading”; or “engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.”86 Section 747 states that it shall be a crime for a person who, while entering into a
securities swap transaction,87 knows or acts in reckless disregard of the fact that “its counterparty
will use the swap as part of a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any third party.”88
The Dodd-Frank Act contains several other provisions that purport to be enforceable by
criminal sanctions.89 The scope of this Comment, however, is limited to evaluating whether the
criminal provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act can facilitate the imposition of criminal liability on
financial executives for fraud and misrepresentation. Therefore, the analysis that follows90 will
focus solely on those aforementioned provisions in Title VII, as they specifically relate to the
making of false or misleading statements or omissions.
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III. Individual Criminal Liability for Corporate Executives
A. The Need for Personal Liability for Corporate Crimes
The imposition of personal liability on corporate executives serves important deterrence
objectives.91 The threat of personal liability for misconduct can dissuade managers and directors
from abusing their positions of power for personal gain.92 It can also encourage these managers
and directors to utilize their oversight authority to inhibit other executives from engaging in selfserving misconduct.93
Furthermore, in the absence of personal liability, punishment would be levied against the
corporation itself. A corporation, however, is a fictional entity.94 When it acts, it is acting
through its agents.95 Therefore, it is not the behavior of the corporation as an entity that needs to
be punished and deterred, but rather the behavior of its agents (i.e., its managers and directors).96
Sanctions against the corporation, which usually take the form of fines, do not serve this
deterrence goal because they “harm innocent parties such as shareholders, consumers, and
creditors, rather than guilty corporate agents.”97
B. Civil Actions Do Not Effectively Impose Personal Liability on Corporate Executives
Not everyone believes that personal liability via the criminal justice system is an
appropriate mechanism for dealing with corporate misconduct.98

High-profile criminal

prosecutions of corporate officers can result in lengthy terms of incarceration for individuals
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with no prior criminal history.99 Accordingly, some scholars argue that private actions in the
civil realm, which impose monetary penalties, provide a more suitable solution.100 The problem
with such an approach, however, is that it fails to address whether the civil system is actually
effective in responding to this kind of misbehavior.101
Under traditional notions of corporate law, directors and officers of corporations are
largely insulated from personal liability.102 First, plaintiffs often face significant procedural and
substantive hurdles in the context of shareholder derivative suits,103 which are suits brought on
behalf of the corporation against executives alleged to have breached their fiduciary duties.104
Procedurally, shareholders are limited in the claims they can bring as a result of the demand
requirement,105 which allows a corporation’s Board of Directors to terminate a derivative suit
before it reaches trial.106 Substantively, if the demand requirement does not bar the claims,
executives are still protected by the deferential business judgment rule. 107 Second, even in cases
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where the business judgment rule is inapplicable, because either the director is found to have
acted in bad faith or the action is one brought by a third party, statutory and contract provisions
may work to exculpate the director from personal liability.108

Finally, assuming that an

executive is found liable and the situation is such that the corporation does not indemnify his or
her actions, the corporation may still provide director and officer insurance that would most
likely cover all payments that are owed by the defendant.109
In addition to the obstacles imposed by law, civil suits also suffer from practical
hindrances. Private lawsuits do not provide an effective response to instances of “low-level
fraud.”110 This is because, for the average shareholder, it is often not economically feasible to
take on the cost of litigation against the managers and directors of a corporation, especially if the
alleged misconduct did not cause substantial diminution in the value of their shares. 111 Joining
together and filing a collective action can also be difficult, especially in light of the
aforementioned procedural and substantive hurdles associated with these suits.112
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agency does decide to bring a case, the penalties are often not significant.113 Therefore, while
directors who engage in misconduct face a theoretical financial risk, this risk does not, in
practice, constitute a legitimate threat.114
Because civil liability is not well-equipped to deter individual executives from engaging
in wrongful acts, it does not provide an adequate remedy for corporate misconduct.115 Since the
risk of detection and liability is small, managers who stand to gain from unlawful activity will
view the possibility of being sanctioned as a mere cost of doing business.116 In the same way
that under-enforcement of petty street crimes can lead to “urban decay,” which in turn leads to
the commission of more serious crimes, one scholar has paralleled the under-enforcement of
“small-scale corporate fraud” as similarly leading to “an environment of renegade entrepreneurs
who are not able to properly assess the probabilities of penalties for certain behaviors.”117
C. Criminal Law Provides a Solution
When applied in the corporate context, criminal law can effectively deter executive
misconduct because it is not inhibited by the protections that executives enjoy in the civil
realm.118 Criminal actions brought by the government are not subject to the same procedural and
substantive hurdles, such as the demand requirement and the business judgment rule, that
typically bar private shareholder actions.119 In addition, exculpatory charter provisions cannot
exculpate a manager or director from personal criminal liability and there are no statutory
indemnifications for violation of criminal laws.120
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As a result, these officers can be held

accountable under criminal law for certain behaviors which, under traditional notions of
corporate law, would not result in personal liability.121
When laws are under-enforced, their ability to deter violations is minimal, regardless of
the potential sanction. It is the certainty of punishment, not its severity, which can more
effectively dissuade an individual from violating the law.122 Because corporate law protections
do not apply to criminal actions, the government has procedural and substantive advantages in
bringing criminal cases that allow it to attain higher conviction rates and, therefore, greater
deterrent effects.123
From a procedural standpoint, prosecutors have significant discretion in charging
decisions.124 Substantively, they have a wide range of crimes within the federal criminal code
from which to choose these charges.125 Grand juries also do not pose much of a hurdle to
prosecutors because they frequently cooperate with prosecutors and return requested
indictments.126 In addition, pleading standards are more favorable for prosecutors than they are
for private plaintiffs. “Unlike shareholder plaintiffs, who must plead fraud with height-ened [sic]
particularity in both state and federal court, prosecutors need only provide a plain, concise, and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”127 As a result,
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it is very uncommon for criminal actions to be dismissed on a motion by the defendant at the
pleading stage.128
Criminal law is also capable of deterring wrongdoing because of its unique sociological
impact. At least one scholar has argued that the aspect of “shaming” implicit in criminal
sanctions can have an “effective influence” on the individual and, correspondingly, corporate
behavior, especially when applied to “top-level corporate executives.”129 These executives are
all part of a common community that is comprised of very “status-conscious” individuals.130
Exposing this population to criminal prosecution, which carries with it the potential for
incarceration, can have damaging effects on their reputations, even when the exposure comes
only in the form of a threat.131 Studies have found that both the anticipation, as well as the
experience, of this type of “shame” can substantially deter corporate crime,132 on both the
general and specific level.133
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The increased certainty of personal liability combined with the stigma associated with
criminal prosecutions provides criminal law with a unique and effective way of targeting
corporate misconduct. Civil suits rarely hold private individuals accountable in the corporate
context.134 The barriers to personal liability, however, do not apply to violations of criminal
law.135 Criminal prosecutions can also result in extra-monetary sanctions and implications,
which enhance their ability to deter wrongdoing.136 The possibility that a corporate executive
may be put in jail, or even placed at a personal financial risk, will affect his or her decisionmaking differently than will the possibility of a fine that will ultimately be paid by the
corporation. Executives are unlikely to consider individual criminal liability to be a “cost of
doing business”; therefore, the imposition of such liability could have strong deterrent
implications not otherwise achievable by civil law.137
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IV. Imposing Criminal Liability on Corporate Executives After the Financial Crisis
A. An Evaluation of the Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
Although the Dodd-Frank Act adds new crimes to the already expansive federal crime
repertoire, it does not substantively give the DOJ a new way to criminally target the dishonest
conduct that is an underlying cause of the recent financial crisis.138 In addition, the fraud
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act do not address the issues that have prevented the DOJ from
bringing criminal indictments against the executives of financial institutions.139 As a result, it is
unlikely that prosecutors will be able to use the Dodd-Frank Act to more successfully impose
criminal liability on Wall Street executives.
First, the Section 741 fraud provisions of Title VII appear to duplicate what is already
criminalized by the mail fraud140 and wire fraud141 statutes of the United States Code.142 The
mail and wire fraud statutes are incredibly broad.143 Wire fraud, which is more applicable today
as information is usually transmitted electronically rather than by mail, imposes criminal liability
on anyone who:
. . . having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both. If the violation . . . affects a financial institution, such person shall
be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or
both.144
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Section 741, by contrast, imposes criminal liability for fraud only when it relates to entering a
future contract or to making a swap on a securities transaction.145 These types of transactions,
however, are necessarily covered by the language of the wire fraud statute. Future contracts and
securities transactions are made for the purpose of “obtaining money or property.”146

In

addition, the jurisdictional requirement that a representation be “transmitted by means of wire . .
. in interstate or foreign commerce”147 is not difficult to meet today, since electronic
communication exists in almost every industry. As a result, Section 741 does not criminalize
any new behavior apart from what can already be prosecuted as wire fraud.
Section 741, moreover, imposes less harsh criminal penalties than the wire fraud statute
does. A defendant who is convicted under Section 741 faces a potential prison term of up to ten
years.148 Under the wire fraud statute, however, the same defendant faces a penalty of up to
thirty years.149 While an increase in severity of punishment does not necessarily lend itself to
more effective deterrence,150 this point emphasizes that Section 741 does not provide any new
mechanism for prosecuting financial fraud.
Furthermore, Section 741 neither alters the criminal intent requirement for federal
securities fraud cases, nor affects the burden of proof that prosecutors must meet to obtain a
criminal conviction.151 But this requirement of showing that defendants, beyond a reasonable
doubt, intended to deceive their investors is exactly what the DOJ struggled to prove in the Bear
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Stearns trial.152 Additionally, the DOJ expressly acknowledged that its inability to fulfill this
requirement was an instrumental factor in its decision to drop its criminal investigation against
Goldman Sachs.153 Since Section 741 does not address the underlying issues that the DOJ has
with respect to these criminal prosecutions, it is unlikely that Section 741 will alter the status quo
by providing a more effective way for the government to criminally investigate and indict
corporate banking executives.
Section 747, by contrast, facially addresses the issue of proving mens rea, as it allows for
liability to be imposed when one acts with reckless disregard that counterparties to his or her
swap transaction will use the swap to defraud.154 Although Section 747 allows a less culpable
state of mind on the part of defendants,155 it does not address the fact that, for liability to be
imposed, the primary offenders (i.e., the ones committing the fraud) still must have intent to
deceive. This is because, in order to show that defendants were criminally reckless, meaning
they consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk,156 with regard to whether the
counterparties would commit fraud, there must be some evidence that the counterparties did, in
fact, intend to commit fraud.157 Even with the lower mens rea standard for secondary offenders,
the DOJ will likely struggle in bringing these cases; the evidentiary difficulties that hinder
investigations against primary offenders will similarly persist during investigations against
secondary offenders. As a result, it is unlikely that Section 747 will be effective in increasing
individual criminal accountability.
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B. A Comparison with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The scarcity and inadequacy of the criminal provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act stand in
stark contrast to the criminal penalties in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.158 The two statutes are similar
in that they were both passed in an effort to curb dishonesty and to increase accountability in the
financial world.159

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, contains a myriad of certification

provisions that are enforceable by criminal penalties.160 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
explicitly provides that a CEO or CFO can go to prison for “falsely certifying corporate financial
reports and reports on internal controls[.]”161 These provisions were a direct response to the
Enron/WorldCom/Tyco accounting scandals162 in the same way that the Dodd-Frank Act was a
response to the recent financial crisis.163
In the years since Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, few, if any, individual
criminal prosecutions have been brought as a result of it. 164 Some critics cite this as a failure of
the Act to hold financial executives accountable.165 What such criticism fails to recognize,
however, is that even without being utilized as a prosecutorial tool, Sarbanes-Oxley has had a
resounding effect on the behavior of corporate executives.166
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After Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many corporations began to require
multiple layers of sub-certification, which mandate that numerous lower-level officials “attest to
the accuracy of financial reports” before such reports reach the CEO or CFO.167 The threat of
personal and criminal liability for false or materially misleading financial reports leads many
CEOs to refuse to sign a report unless it is certified by a lower-level executive.168 In fact, one
survey of corporate leaders found that, on average, between twenty-two and twenty-three
executives submit a sub-certification for a report before it is signed by the CEO or CFO.169
The practical effect of this change is that corporations had to become more vigilant in
their financial reporting procedures at all levels.170 In this way, increased personal accountability
for false or materially misleading financial statements deters fraudulent reporting, and as a result,
“there have been few accounting scandals at major public corporations since Sarbanes-Oxley
took effect.”171
Further, the fact that Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act during a time when the
federal government was comparatively much more aggressive in prosecuting financial fraud172
likely amplifies its effectiveness with regard to deterrence. The criminal convictions of financial
CEOs such as Enron’s Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling send a message to the corporate world
that the government will not tolerate this type of ethical misconduct. Combined with SarbanesOxley’s creation of new targeted federal crimes, the perceived probability of an individual
financial executive being held criminally liable for false or misleading financial statements is
greatly increased. This consequence, in turn, allows for a much greater deterrent effect.
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C. A Proposal to More Effectively Impose Criminal Liability
In the way that legislators specifically drafted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to hold individual
financial executives accountable for the conduct underlying the accounting scandals of the early
2000s, this Comment proposes that the Dodd-Frank Act would be a more valuable tool in
deterring and prosecuting the conduct underlying the recent financial crisis if it contained more
substantive criminal provisions that directly targeted financial executives.
For example, the Dodd-Frank Act could include provisions similar to the certification
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, imposing requirements on high-ranking corporate officials
that are enforceable through criminal penalties. This could entail quarterly statements certifying
that the CEO or CFO has reviewed both the internal risk-management controls of the institution
and the investor disclosures and has independently determined that both are adequate and nonmisleading.
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act could impose disclosure requirements any senior-level
executive who decides to override an underwriter’s decision to not purchase and securitize a
particular bundle of loans because the loans in the bundle do not meet the institution’s
underwriting standards. Namely, the executive could be mandated to issue a statement outlining
the reasons behind the decision and why he or she believes that the risks associated with the
investment should be overlooked. This requirement would impose a greater degree of individual
accountability on senior-level executives for excessive risk-taking and encourage more ex ante
consideration of consequences.
In addition, creating more targeted crimes would allow the DOJ to bring more narrowly
tailored cases against individuals, which may help the DOJ in proving intent beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury. The DOJ cited an inability to prove mens rea as the key issue that forestalled its
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prosecution of the Bear Stearns managers for fraud in 2009.173 The government tried to frame
the case as one of straightforward lying, but the jury did not believe the situation to be so
simple.174 The ability to utilize a statute that more directly addresses the type of behavior at
issue—making misleading, and even false, statements to investors regarding the risks of their
investments—would increase the government’s chances of convincing a jury of criminal intent.
This is because the criminality of the conduct would no longer be at issue. When the
DOJ charged the Bear Stearns managers with fraud, it had to prove to the jury not only that the
managers intentionally misled investors, but also that the act of misleading investors was an
instance of criminal fraud, rather than a “permissible spin” of the facts. 175 If, however, statutory
support had been available for the government to assert that misleading investors is a criminal
act, then the government would only have needed to prove the first issue to the jury: that the
individuals intended their statements to be misleading. The confusion that exists as to whether or
not this type of misrepresentation should be criminally punished would dissipate.
Furthermore, this alternative would be more desirable than lowering the mens rea
standard for criminal fraud to recklessness or gross negligence, as doing so could have
potentially catastrophic consequences on the financial industry. Risk-taking is an inherent part
of participation in financial markets, and criminal laws should not be aimed at constraining
opportunistic behavior. Rather, it is only when one crosses the line and employs deceptive
techniques to gain a tactical advantage within the market or to make excessive profits at the
expense of others that the criminal law must intervene.
Finally, this is not to say that the Dodd-Frank Act, as currently enacted, holds no
potential to facilitate the prosecution of financial fraud. The recent financial crisis was different
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from those of the past in that the allegedly fraudulent behavior took place on a secondary
derivatives market which, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, was virtually unregulated.176 In past
crises, the government brought successful criminal actions against individuals, in part, because
regulators had the ability to refer such claims to prosecutors.177 The lack of regulation, therefore,
not only made the perpetration of fraud more feasible in the years leading up to the crisis, but
also made fraud more difficult to pursue in the aftermath.178 By increasing regulation in the
world of derivative transactions and other swaps of complex securities, the Dodd-Frank Act will
better equip the government to build criminal cases in the future, should the need arise.
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V. Conclusion
The Dodd-Frank Act holds some potential for increasing criminal accountability for highranking bank executives; however, this is not a result of the Act’s criminal provisions. Although
the Act creates a number of new crimes, it only superficially gives prosecutors a new way to
target financial fraud. The problem with the cases brought by the DOJ in response to the recent
financial crisis was that the prosecutors could not prove criminal intent beyond a reasonable
doubt. This Comment proposes alternative criminal provisions that would be better suited to
address this impediment. If the Dodd-Frank Act contained more narrowly tailored criminal
provisions, it could better aid prosecutors in proving intent, without actually lowering the intent
standard. In addition, even if not heavily utilized, the presence of strong, targeted criminal
penalties in the Act could still serve a valuable deterrent function, thereby preventing a similar
crisis from arising again.

31

